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Recent Developments 
Long v. State: 
Courts Cannot Modify a Consent Order Without Giving the Parties an 
Opportunity to Be Heard Because to Do Otherwise Would Violate the Parties' 
Right to Due Process 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that courts 
cannot modify a consent order without 
giving the parties notice and an 
opportunity to be heard because to 
do otherwise would violate the 
parties' right to due process. Long 
v. State, 371 Md 72, 807 A.2d 1 
(2002). In so holding, the court 
reinforced the effect of a consent 
order by requiring that court ordered 
modifications occur only after the 
parties are given a full opportunity to 
be heard on the matter. 
Derrick Long, Sr. was ordered 
to pay $25 per week child support 
for his daughter. Long neglected to 
comply with the order and failed to 
appear for the hearing addressing his 
neglect to provide child support. 
Pursuant to Md. Rule 15-207( e), the 
state filed a petition for contempt in 
the circuit court. At the contempt 
hearing, evidence showed Long failed 
to pay any support or arrearage 
resulting in back owed support of 
$2975.00. Longc1aimedjailandjob 
problems caused non-payment, 
however the trial court found no 
legitimate reason to prevent Long from 
working. The court also found that 
Long had no personal assets of any 
kind. 
The Circuit Court for 
Washington County found Long in 
contempt from May 1999 through 
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September 1999 and ordered Long 
imprisoned pending payment of$700 
to purge the contempt. Long 
appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland. In addition, 
Long and the state filed ajoint motion 
to vacate the sentence arguing that the 
state could not sanction him with 
incarceration because he had no ability 
to pay the purge amount required to 
release him from incarceration. The 
parties attached a consent order to the 
motion, stating that the sentence was 
to be vacated and Long was to be 
released. The order did not provide 
for remand for further consideration. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland vacated the contempt 
charge, but remanded the case to the 
Circuit Court for Washington County, 
to determine what, if any, conditions 
of release reasonably assured the 
petitioner's appearance at further 
proceedings. Long and the State ap-
pealed the ruling, alleging that the 
court abused its discretion by 
modifying the agreed upon consent 
order resulting in a material change. 
In a joint motion to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, the parties 
claimed that the intermediate court 
erred in modifying the consent order, 
thereby making the order adverse to 
the intent of the parties. Long 
contended that the court's actions 
deprived the parties the benefit of their 
bargain, and that in holding as it did, 
the intermediate court deprived the 
parties of their right to litigate through 
briefing and oral arguments on merits. 
Finally, Long asserted that, according 
to Md. Rule 15-207( e), he could not 
be incarcerated pending a hearing 
because he had no ability to purge 
himself of the contempt. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland first examined consent 
orders generally, defining them as 
hybrids that combine contract law 
and judicial decrees. Id at 82, 807 
A.2d at 7. Consent orders memor-
ialize an agreement of parties who 
relinquish the right to litigate the matter 
in exchange for a certain, carefully 
negotiated, outcome. Id The court 
noted that consent orders have the 
"same force and effect as any other 
judgments .... " Id. (citing Jones, 
356 Md. 513, 740 A.2d 1004 
(1999». 
The court further explained that 
the parties define the scope of a 
consent agreement. Therefore, a 
court must first look to the agreement 
to interpret it. Long, 371 Md. at 83, 
807 A.2d at 7. The court noted that 
when interpreting a consent order the 
objective test of contracts applies. 
Id at 84, 807 A.2d at 8. The court 
must consider "[t ]he written language 
... , irrespective of the intent ofthe 
parties ... , unless the written 
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language is not susceptible of clear and 
definite understanding, or unless there 
is fraud, duress, or mutual mistake." 
Id The court further noted that public 
policy dictates that consent orders be 
accepted because "law favors 
compromise and amicable 
adjustments." Id. (quoting Sisson 
v. Baltimore, 51 Md. 83 (1879)). 
The court continued by 
addressing whether the intermediate 
court erred in modifying the consent 
order. Id. at 81, 807 A.2d at 7. The 
court reiterated the general rule that 
consent orders cannot be modified by 
the court; they should be accepted or 
denied as proposed. Long, 371 Md. 
at 87, 807 A.2d at 10. Courts may 
suggest modifications and allow the 
parties to amend the consent order on 
their own. In addition, the court stated 
that when a court modifies a consent 
order an appeal is allowable. Id. 
The court further stated that, 
generally, parties cannot appeal a 
consent order after it has been 
accepted by the court. Id at 86, 807 
A.2d at 9. Parties who enter into a 
consent order agree to give up legal 
rights to litigate the matter. Id. 
However, a court's refusal to enter 
consent is reviewable for abuse of 
discretion. Id. 
In applying these principles, the 
court observed that the proposed 
consent order provided that Long's 
sentence be vacated and had no 
provision for remand to the circuit 
court. Long, 371 Md. at 88, 807 
A.2d at 10. The court of special 
appeals modified the order by 
remanding the case to the circuit court 
and SUbjecting Long to incarceration 
without an opportunity to be heard. 
33.1 U. Bait L.F. 34 
Id. at 89, 807 A.2d at 11. In ac-
knowledging the intermediate court's 
attempt to ensure Long's appearance 
at future hearings, the court of appeals 
indicated that the parties could have 
included provisions to secure Long's 
appearance at further proceedings in 
their agreement. The court cannot 
materially modify the existing 
agreement and alter the bargain of the 
parties. Id. 
The court noted that while it is 
greatly concerned over Long's failure 
to pay child support, the ultimate goal 
is not to punish parents, but to provide 
support for children. Id. at 92, 807 
A.2d at 13. The court held that the 
court of special appeals erred in 
modifying the consent order without 
giving the parties notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, and 
remanded the case in part. Id. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has reinforced Maryland 
law dealing with consent orders. This 
reinforcement continues to support the 
strength and weight of consent orders. 
Consent orders should be given 
reverence by the courts when the 
order does not violate fairness and is 
reasonable. Courts can still accept 
or reject a proposed order; however, 
courts seeking to modify a consent 
order must give the parties notice and 
allow them an opportunity to be heard 
This supports the constitutional 
protection of parties. Further, 
judgments that modify consent orders 
without these protections will be 
subject to reversal on appeal. The 
strictness and inflexibility of consent 
orders suggests that parties, and 
therefore their attorneys, must be very 
precise in drafting. This holding 
protects the parties' rights to agree to 
settle a civil matter, coinciding with 
public policy. 
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